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Abstract
Culture evolves following a process that is akin to biological evolution, although with some
significant differences. At the same time culture has often a collective good value for human
groups. This paper studies culture in an evolutionary perspective, with a focus on the implications
of group definition for the coexistence of different cultures. A model of cultural evolution is
presented where agents interacts in an artificial environment. The belonging to a specific memetic
group is a major factor allowing agents to exploit different environmental niches with, as a result,
the coexistence of different cultures in the same environment.
1 Introduction
Richard Dawkins, who first introduced the term meme, described it as a replicator: a unit of cultural
transmission which propagate itself in the meme pool in analogy to what genes do in the gene pool
(Dawkins 1976, Chap. 11). More generally, he proposed a deep analogy between biological and cul-
tural evolution, with the latter encompassing memes that replicate trough imitation, mutate when new
cultural variants are produced and compete for human brain resources. While this analogy must not
be taken too far — critics underline, for instance, that memes have often weakly-defined boundaries,
replicate with much less fidelity than genes or that selection pressures on memes derive from little
understood mechanisms (e.g. Atran 2001; Richerson and Boyd 2005; Wimsatt 1999) — at a more
general level there are little doubts that some kind of evolutionary process underlies culture devel-
opment and change (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Dawkins 1976; Mesoudi et al. 2004; Plotkin 1993;
Rogers and Ehrlich 2008; Richerson and Boyd 2005).
Thinking to culture as an evolutionary process is not without problems. Among them, especially
intriguing is the fact that, given a constant or sufficiently slow changing selective pressure, replicators
should converge in the long run into a small number of highly adapted forms. However, as an enor-
mous number of genera and species live side to side in the biological world, cultural variants coexists
in the cultural world. The paradox of the presence of a large biodiversity, resulting from apparently
converging selective pressures, is resolved in natural sciences using the concept of niche adaptation
and taking into account the constant moving of species between regions (Hubbell 2001; Sugihara et al.
2003; Tilman 2004). However, few social scientists have taken the problem from this point of view,
focusing instead their research on mechanisms connected to some structural characteristics of human
societies rather than with the cultural environment itself (e.g. Axelrod 1997).
We present here a model of cultural evolution where agents are able to exploit different niches
on an artificial environment. This ability is strictly linked with their belonging to a memetic group
(that can be viewed as a culture). More precisely, agents belonging to a group share a part of their
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“memotype” (Speel 1997). Instead of imitating any other agent in the population, agents updating
their strategies tend follow the ones already present in their own group. However, agents can also
choose to change their group: a fact that produces a multilevel selection process. Note that, while
multilevel selection is a source of unending debate in biology (for a recent review see Kohn 2008), it
may be more plausible in reference to cultural evolution (Richerson et al. 2003; Richerson and Boyd
2005; Soltis et al. 1995; Wilson and Sober 1994). In our model, belonging to a specific memetic
group allows agents to exploit different niches of their environment with, as a result, the coexistence
of different memotypes in the same population. This in contrast with a model where selection takes
place only at the level of individual agent leading instead to the fixation of a single memotype. Finally,
we show that a situation when changes in the meme pool of agents also modify the environment where
they interact favor the establishment of coexisting memetic groups in the system and, more generally,
it is able to model realistic evolutionary processes.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the research background.
Section 3 defines our cultural evolution model and presents the corresponding results. Section 4
defines and presents the results of the niche construction model, where agents’ evolution affects also
the state of the environment. Finally, Section 5 discusses the results.
2 Groups, niches and cultural differences
One of the seminal and most well known researches trying to model culture evolution and dissemina-
tion is Robert Axelrod (1997) work on Social influence. Its main result is that cultural differences can
be sustained, despite the effect of mechanisms like homophily and social influence, by the creation
of boundaries between “cultural regions”. In Axelrod’s model, n agents interact on a regular lattice,
typically a 2D, 10× 10 grid. Each agent has a cultural state defined by a vector of F elements (cul-
tural features), which can assume any of q different discrete values. Agents’ initial state is defined
randomly. Subsequently, a pair of neighboring agents is selected in each time step, with their inter-
action probability depending on the respective states: it is zero when the couple shares no features
and increases proportionally to the number of shared features (homophily assumption). When two
agents interacts, one of them copies one of the unshared features of the other (social influence). The
simulation continues until a stable state is reached, either because all agents reach the same state or
because stable boundaries emerge between cultural regions composed by agents sharing no features.
Axelrod shows that, under a wide range of condition, the latter outcome is more likely: a fact that tend
to maintain over time cultural differences in the system.
This result is interesting, especially because it holds despite the fact that the interactions occur in a
regular space presenting no possibilities of niche differentiation and that the modeled features possess
no adaptive meaning for the agents. The Social influence model represents hence an alternative to
biological explanations of biodiversity based on the niche adaptation concept. Unfortunately, subse-
quent works have shown that Axelrod’s results depend critically on a few implausible assumptions,
including the absence of noise in the transmission process (Klemm et al. 2003a) and discrete cultural
variants (Flache and Macy 2006), possibly drawn from a large set (Klemm et al. 2003b). Moreover,
Axelrod’s results hold only under the assumption of perfect homophily, i.e. a null interaction proba-
bility between agents sharing no cultural features. The creation of impermeable boundaries represents
indeed the key factor able to guarantee pluralism (Axelrod 1997). The problem with this assumption
is that no boundary is perfectly impenetrable in the real world, while relaxing it leads inevitably to an
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(a) 01234 (0) 01234 (0) 01234 (0) 56789 (0) 56789 (0) 56789
(b) 01234 (0) 01234 (0) 01234 (ε/n) 56789 (0) 56789 (0) 56789
(c) 01234 (0) 01234 (0) 01234 (0.2/n) 06789 (0.8/n) 56789 (0) 56789
Figure 1: Effect of the introduction of an arbitrarily small probability of interaction between agents
with no traits in common in a 1D version of Axelrod’s Social influence model. The probability of
interaction between two neighbors is in parenthesis.
homogeneous state in the long run.1
The example in Figure 1 illustrates the effect of introducing an arbitrarily small probability of
interaction between agents sharing no features (ε ) in a system where six agents interact on a one-
dimensional lattice.2 Each agent has five cultural features that can assume any integer value between
zero and nine. Line (a) presents an equilibrium situation as described by Axelrod, with a stable cultural
boundary between the third and the fourth agent. Line (b) shows the same situation but for a small
ε probability of interaction between the two middle agents sharing no cultural trait. The probability
that the fourth agent is selected and copies one feature from the third one is ε/2n. Taking into account
that also the third agent has the same probability of copying one trait from the fourth one, the overall
interaction probability is ε/n. No matter how small, this probability is strictly greater than zero and,
given a sufficient amount of time, the fourth agent will actually copy one feature from the third one
(or vice versa). This leads to the situation depicted in line (c), with an increase of the interaction
probability between the fourth agent and both its neighbors. More generally, the system moves away
from the stable state in a process that is self-reinforcing. Actually it is quite intuitive that a system
with a probability of interaction between agents sharing no features is greater than zero possesses only
one stable state: the one in which all agents are identical. Simulations based on the Axelrod’s model
confirm this intuition.
Our argument is that Axelrod’s model most fundamental problem derives from the uniform space
where agent interacts, which does not allow the exploitation of different niches by different cultures.
This is vastly different from what happens for biological evolution, and also from what we know from
the functioning of social systems, where different groups are usually able to find vastly different ways
of making a living by exploiting different resources. For instance, pastoral communities can live close
to farmers by using different natural resources. Moreover, higher level specialists, like merchants, can
rely only indirectly on natural resources by exploiting niches built up by the work of other individuals.
The link between different environments (or niches) and different cultures is supported by some
classical anthropological studies (Harris 1979). Henrich and Boyd (1998) developed a model where
different subpopulations are able to evolve specific adaptations to the different environments where
they live, despite a significant amount of migration among them. The core of the model is “conformist
transmission”, i.e. the fact that agents tend to imitate disproportionately the most commons behavior
in their group. From our point of view, it is especially important to remark that conformist transmis-
sion, while it favors within-group cultural homogeneity, appears to be able to maintain between-group
differences. However, the model achieves this result by building separate environments with oppo-
1Flache and Macy (2006) first discussed this fragility of the model, even if they apparently failed to recognize its full
power in undermining Axelrod’s conclusions.
2A 1D system is used here for simplicity, but the same argument holds for multidimensional systems as well, including
the regular 2D lattice used by Axelrod.
3
site adaptive needs. It does hence not explain how cultural diversity can be maintained when agents
interact in the same environment. On the contrary, the effect of conformist transmission in a single
environment setting is likely to lead to a homogeneous state.
An alternative approach is thinking about cultures in terms of biological species (Mace and Holden
2005; Pagel and Mace 2004). The core of the species concept is that organisms from different species
cannot interbreed successfully. Biodiversity derives hence from niche adaptation, but it is maintained
thanks to strong barriers to the gene flow. If the analogy between cultures and species holds, it implies
that the “interbreeding” among cultures must be limited in order to maintain diversity. This is actually
what happens in human groups, where a number of mechanisms exist to limit cultural and possibly
genetic influences from other groups (Pagel and Mace 2004; Richerson and Boyd 2001). While this
may surprise cosmopolitan citizens of modern cities, empirical studies actually show that a large pro-
portion of cultural transmission occurs phylogenetically within groups, including (of course) families
and (more generally) homogeneous cultural groups (Guglielmino et al. 1995; Mace and Holden 2005).
The consequence of a reduction the meme flow among cultures is a decrease of within-group
variation and a corresponding increase of between-group variation: a situation that increases the pos-
sibility that selection processes occur also at the group level, as acknowledged also by group-selection
skeptics (e.g. Dawkins 1989, Chap. 13). This is actually one of the reasons why group selection pro-
cesses are more likely to be a significant force in cultural than in biological evolution (Richerson et al.
2003; Richerson and Boyd 2005; Soltis et al. 1995; Wilson and Sober 1994). Another reason is that,
although appealing, the cultures-as-species metaphor is wrong in one important detail: unlike biolog-
ical organisms, that are rarely able to acquire DNA from other living beings,3 memes in human brains
are relatively easy to change at any point of an individual’s life. This has important consequences,
because intergroup migration represents a major factor undermining group-selection processes in bi-
ological evolution (Maynard Smith 1976). On the contrary, human migrants often acquire the culture
of their new groups, making hence migration less effective in reducing between-group variation. This,
along with the high levels of intergroup conflict typical of human societies (e.g. Soltis et al. 1995),
makes group selection processes plausible, if not probable, for cultural evolution (Richerson and Boyd
2005, Chap. 6): a fact that justifies our choice of modeling a multilevel selection process (see below).
Before proceeding with the model definition, one more point should be carefully discussed: the
value of a given culture for the people who share it. Using a strict “meme-eye view” the only interest
of the memes would be to create as many copies of themselves as possible. However, from the point
of view of individuals hosting these memes, their value is clearly linked to the opportunities that they
offer in finding adequate ways of making a living. Similarly, the adaptiveness of a given group to its
environment depends on the culture shared by its members. Cultures allowing groups to exploit some
environmental niche hence possess the value of a shared resource. While natural shared resources
often present “tragedy of the commons” problems leading to their depletion or destruction (Hardin
1968), cultural commons tend instead to increase their value with use (Boiller 2007; Hess and Ostrom
2007). For instance, the value of a software or of a piece of scientific knowledge increases as more
people use it. The problem here is indeed not overuse, like in natural commons, but reaching the
critical mass that makes a given culture self-sustaining.
In order to coexist, cultures should also allow their members to exploit different niches of the
social or of the natural environment (or both). Otherwise, in absence of perfectly impermeable bound-
aries, selection processes tend to lead to the fixation of a single culture. Each group must hence be
able to define and use its own “cultural commons”, i.e. the shared cultural resource allowing the ex-
3This happens mainly in bacteria and other microbes: asexual organisms for whom species are weakly defined.
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ploitation of a specific niche in its environment. Note that, even if cultural commons do not suffer
from overuse, still they have to be maintained and protected from “erosion”, i.e. the undermining of
their internal coherence following uncontrolled changes. However, no sustainable use of a commons
is likely without the definition of boundaries, including limits of its users’ group (Ostrom 1990). This
point parallels hence the above group-selection argument in supporting a strong influence of group
barriers in making the coexistence of different cultures possible.
Our arguments can be summarized in two hypotheses. First any coexistence among cultures need
boundaries. They may not be perfectly impermeable, as in Axelrod’s model, but still they should be
strong enough to permit the definition of in-group and out-group members. Most of the times, bound-
aries in human societies are quite strong and produce within-group cooperation and favoritism and
between-group competition or conflict (Bernhard et al. 2006; Iida 2007; Richerson and Boyd 2001;
Soltis et al. 1995; Tajfel and Turner 1986). Nevertheless, boundaries are not a sufficient condition
since, in absence of the possibility of exploiting different niches, competition will lead to the disap-
pearance of the weakest groups and, in the long run, to the fixation of a single culture. Our second
hypothesis is hence that cultures can coexist by allowing their members to exploit different niches
of their social-ecological system,4 just as specialization (and often speciation) allows different organ-
isms to exploit different ecosystem niches. The models presented in the next sections will explore
these ideas.
3 The cultural evolution models
In order to test our hypotheses, we designed two simulation models. The first one, named Base,
represents our benchmark. It defines our artificial agents and environment, but supports no group
processes or boundaries. In the Group model, boundaries among groups of agents are instead explicitly
defined, even if they are not perfectly impermeable.
3.1 Base model definition
The base model is formed by N agents, representing organisms, interacting on an abstract environ-
ment.5 The environment E is simply a sequence of n binary numbers. It is randomly determined at
the beginning of each run and remains subsequently constant. Each of the N agents possess a “memo-
type” M formed by a sequence of m = 6 binary numbers. This gives a total of 64 possible memotypes.
Adopting a population of 256 agents, we have an average of 4 agents per memotype. At the beginning
of each run, memotypes are determined randomly, while they are subsequently free to evolve. During
each period of the game agents earn a variable number of points. The payoff of each agent depends on
the correspondence between its memotype and the environment. More specifically, each time that M
corresponds exactly to a sub-sequence of E the agent earns one point (Fig. 2 left). The period payoff
is simply the sum of all points earned by a given agent in a single period.
A fundamental feature of the model is the imitation process occurring at the end of each period.
During imitation, one of the agents with the lowest period payoff copies the memotype of one of
the agents with the highest period payoff. However, a small mutation probability µ exists. When a
mutation occurs the new memotype of the low payoff earner is randomly defined. Note that the term
4For a definition of social-ecological systems, see Berkes and Folke (1998).
5All models have been implemented in C++. Codes are available upon request.
5
Base model Group model
Memotype
M︷ ︸︸ ︷
101000
Mg︷︸︸︷
101
Mi︷︸︸︷
000
Environment . . .01011
︷ ︸︸ ︷
101000 11011 . . . . . .01011
︷ ︸︸ ︷
101000 11011 . . .
Figure 2: Example of memotype-environment correspondence in the Base and the Group models.
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Figure 3: Average number of niches per environment lengt for a memotype of length m = 6. Standard
deviations are represented as dotted lines.
mutation should not be taken here in a strict biological meaning. Rather, it stands for innovations and
new ideas entering the game and allowing for the exploration of new parts of the environment.
Before proceeding with the definition of the Group model, it is important to understand how the
length of the environment influences the number of niches where agents can make their living. We
define a niche as a sub-sequence of E of length m leading to the maximal period payoff for an agent
holding the corresponding memotype. For instance, let us suppose the case where E = {0,0,0,1,1,1}
and m = 2. Both the memotypes M00 = {0,0} and M11 = {1,1} earn two points per period, while
M01 = {0,1} earns one point and M10 = {1,0} zero points. The two memotypes M00 and M11represent
cultural variations that are neutral in respect to the selection process, both leading to the maximal
payoff. Following the definition above, E possesses hence two niches.
In order to choose the environment length to use in the model, we explored the number of niches in
our environment for m = 6 and n ∈ {10,15, . . . ,300}. The results of a sample of 10000 environments
for each value of n are reported in Figure 3. It is clear that the number of niches (but also the standard
deviation) reach a peak at n≈ 3m, reduces rapidly up to n≈ 100, while for higher values of n it shows
a continuous, although extremely slow, decline .6
It would be tempting to choose for our simulations values of n leading to a high number of niches.
6Note that a similar trend of peak as subsequently slow decline is present also for other values of m.
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However, the standard deviation corresponding to low values of n is extremely high (Fig. 3), a factor
that could undermine the stability of our results. We hence preferred to use the smaller value of n
leading reasonably close to the level of 2 niches. This resulted to be n = 150, corresponding to an
average of 1.97 niches per environment.
3.2 Group model definition
The Group model introduces boundaries in the game, making some memes easier to adopt than others.
More specifically, the Group model maintains all the elements of the Base one except for the fact
that the memotype of each agent is now formed by the concatenation of two sequences, Mg and Mi,
composed by mg and (m−mg) binary numbers respectively. The former identifies the section of the
memotype common to each group while the latter defines the agent’s specific memotype. Once the
two sequences are concatenated, the memotype-environment correspondence is checked as in the Base
model (Fig. 2 right). The imitation process occurs as in the previous case, but it now concerns only
Mi. Moreover, imitators and imitation targets are selected inside each group. This means that, for each
Mg sequence, one hight-earner agent and one low-earner agent are selected, with the latter copying the
former’s Mi. The mutation probability is as in the Base model.
The Group model introduces a further process, called “migration”, working side to side with im-
itation. Migration regards only Mg and concerns the whole population of agents. At the end of each
period, one of the agents with the lowest payoff is selected as “migrant”. The “migrant” changes its
group and adopts the Mg sequence of one of the agents with the highest payoff. Again a mutation
probability µ exists, modeling the individual decision to form a new group. Note that making the mu-
tation probability of migration different from the imitation one proved not to be crucial in influencing
the final result in some pilot runs. In order to limit the number of parameter in the simulation, we
hence decided to maintain a single parameter for both kind of mutations.
3.3 Results
We explored three different values of the mutation probability parameter and three dimensions of mg,
namely µ ∈ {0.01,0.05,0.10} and mg ∈ {2,3,4}. In order to take into account the stochastic elements
of the models, we performed 1000 runs for each parameter configuration. We hence tested 3 parameter
configurations for the Base model and 3×3 parameter configurations for the Group one, for a total of
12000 runs. Each run lasted for 5000 periods and included 256 agents.
Figure 4 presents the plots resulting from typical runs of the Base and Group models under dif-
ferent parameter conditions. It is clear than, while the Base model tends to produce a single large
memetic group (i.e. a group of agents sharing the same memotype), the Group one is more favorable
to the co-existence of different “cultures”. However, this holds mainly for low values of µ , while
higher ones tend to drive the Group model close to the results of the Base one.
In order to test whether the differences highlighted in the plots are statistically relevant, we counted
the number of memetic groups in each of the 1000 runs performed for each parameter configuration.
More specifically, we counted the number of memetic groups composed by more than 4 agent — i.e a
group larger than what we should expect if the agents’ memotypes were randomly distributed — and
composed by more than 25 agents, — i.e. a group including more than 10% of the agents. A summary
of the results is reported in Table 1. Since at the beginning of each run the agents are randomly
distributed among memotypes, the reported results refer only to the second half of the simulation,
namely from period 2500 onwards.
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Group model: mg = 4, µ = 0.1
Figure 4: Agents in each memotype in typical runs of the Base and the Group models. The line width
is proportional to the dimension of the memetic group.
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Model
Memetic groups µ Base Group: mg = 2 Group: mg = 3 Group: mg = 4
> 4 0.01 1.76 (1.20) 3.20 (0.77) ∗∗∗ 4.12 (1.65) ∗∗∗ 3.66 (2.38) ∗∗∗
> 4 0.05 1.84 (1.26) 2.03 (0.81) ∗∗∗ 1.80 (0.88) 1.77 (0.97)
> 4 0.10 1.88 (1.39) 1.52 (0.61) ∗∗∗ 1.39 (0.55) ∗∗∗ 1.35 (0.57) ∗∗∗
> 25 0.01 1.56 (0.82) 2.70 (0.75) ∗∗∗ 2.12 (0.94) ∗∗∗ 1.67 (0.87) ∗∗
> 25 0.05 1.61 (0.84) 1.68 (0.67) ∗ 1.44 (0.62) ∗∗∗ 1.40 (0.58) ∗∗∗
> 25 0.10 1.62 (0.90) 1.36 (0.51) ∗∗∗ 1.28 (0.46) ∗∗∗ 1.22 (0.41) ∗∗∗
Table 1: Number of memetic groups including more than 4 and 25 agents in the final 2500 periods
of the simulation. Results are averaged over 1000 runs per experimental condition with standard
deviations in parenthesis. Significance codes (t test between corresponding conditions of the Base and
the Group models): ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05.
The quantitative analysis confirms the hints offered by Figure 4. The Group model leads to a
significantly higher number of coexisting memetic groups than the Base one, at least for µ = 0.01. A
t test shows indeed that, for all mg values, the number of memetic groups is significantly higher in the
Group model than in the corresponding Base model. The standard for the Group model is indeed the
coexistence of two large groups (more than 25 agents) plus possibly one or two smaller groups. On
the other hand, only one large group is almost ever present int the Base model, leaving at most the
space for one further smaller group.
The picture changes when µ increases. From one hand, the number of memetic groups in the
Base model tends to increase: a fact that is rather surprising, since high mutation rates weaken the
“efficiency” of the selection process, leaving more room for alternative memotypes. On the other
hand, increasing the mutation probability has rather dramatic effects for the Group model. For any
value of µ ≥ 0.05 the number of memetic groups in the Group model is no longer higher than the one
in the Base model. For µ = 0.10 this figure becomes even smaller than the corresponding one in the
Base model.
4 The niche construction models
The models presented above offer some interesting insights, but only partially answer to our questions.
This for two main reasons. First, while they succeed in modeling the selection process, they do not
reproduce the death and birth of groups typical of the cultural world. In other words, they do not lead
to a real evolution of alternative cultures. Second, the Group model lead to the coexistence of different
memotypes only under the condition of high copy fidelity of cultural traits: something that is likely
not to happen in the real world (Richerson and Boyd 2005).
What is probably missing from these models is that organisms often modify the environment
where they live, affecting also the possibilities of making a living of other organisms. Some authors
further expand this idea by arguing that, since the action of any organism modifies the availability of
resources for other organisms, this changes the selective pressures existing in the environment. This
process is called “niche construction” (Laland and Boogert 2008; Odling-Smee et al. 2003) and there
is no reason to imagine that it does not apply to cultural evolution. On the contrary, modern human
economies represent a clear example of enormous differentiation based on what other individuals do,
think, produce and consume. In order to reproduce this and similar facts, we hence decided to build
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Model
Memetic groups µ NC-base NC-gr.: mg = 2 NC-gr.: mg = 3 NC-gr.: mg = 4
> 4 0.01 1.31 (0.66) 2.46 (0.73) ∗∗∗ 2.57 (1.03) ∗∗∗ 2.70 (1.11) ∗∗∗
> 4 0.05 1.30 (0.62) 2.02 (0.25) ∗∗∗ 2.00 (0.31) ∗∗∗ 2.16 (0.41) ∗∗∗
> 4 0.10 1.30 (0.65) 2.12 (0.08) ∗∗∗ 1.92 (0.25) ∗∗∗ 2.02 (0.15) ∗∗∗
> 25 0.01 1.25 (0.55) 2.25 (0.57) ∗∗∗ 2.13 (0.61) ∗∗∗ 2.14 (0.45) ∗∗∗
> 25 0.05 1.23 (0.49) 1.99 (0.19) ∗∗∗ 1.92 (0.31) ∗∗∗ 2.03 (0.21) ∗∗∗
> 25 0.10 1.23 (0.53) 2.00 (0.02) ∗∗∗ 1.88 (0.29) ∗∗∗ 2.00 (0.13) ∗∗∗
Table 2: Number of memetic groups including more than 4 and 25 agents in the final 2500 periods
of the simulation. Results are averaged over 1000 runs per experimental condition with standard
deviations in parenthesis. Significance codes (t test between corresponding conditions of the NC-base
and the NC-group models): ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05.
two further models where the environment is no longer fixed, but varies throughout the simulation as
a function of the agents’ memotypes.
4.1 Model definiton
The new models derive from the previous ones and maintain their structure. More specifically, every-
thing but the environment definition remains as in the Base and the Group models. We hence called the
two new models NC-base and NC-group, where “NC” stands for niche construction. What changes is
that the environment definition is no longer a process on its own. The environment is instead built by
concatenating the complements of each element of the agents’ memotypes. An example will make this
point clearer. Given a model including three agents with memotypes M1 = {0,0,0}, M2 = {1,1,1}
and M3 = {1,0,1}, the environment is E = {1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0}, which leads to a payoff of two, one
and zero points respectively for the three agents. The choice of using the memotype complements per-
mits to avoid the tautological condition where agents are adapted to themselves. On the contrary, each
agent creates the possibility of making a living (a niche) for a different agent in a dynamic process
that mimics what happens in the natural and the social world.
4.2 Results
In order to test the new models we used the same parameter configurations explored for the cultural
evolution models (except, obviously, for the environment length which is now given by the number
of agents times the memotype length). We hence performed a total of 12000 runs of the new mod-
els. Figure 5 presents the plots of typical runs of the NC-base and NC-group models under different
parameter conditions while Table 2 summarizes the statistics.
From Figure 5 two main consideration arise. First, the NC-group model leads to the coexistence
of memetic groups under all the examined parameter conditions and it is much less weakened by
high mutation rates than the Group model. Second, the evolutionary process looks more credible,
with births and deaths of “cultures” and, more generally, with a greater number of changes during the
course of the run.
Table 2 confirms that the number of coexisting memotype groups is significantly larger in the NC-
group model than in the NC-base for all parameter configurations. Note also that standard deviations
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Figure 5: Agents in each memotype in typical runs of the NC-base and the NC-group models. The
line width is proportional the dimension of the memetic group.
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are much lower than in the cultural evolution models, witnessing a greater convergence of the niche
construction models towards a clear equilibrium.
5 Discussion
The main result of research is that group definition is effective in producing cultural heterogeneity,
even in condition of a partial permeability of the boundaries. This support our first hypothesis, i.e. that
the coexistence among cultures needs (imperfect) boundaries, under less restrictive condition than the
Axelrod’s model. In the Base model coexistence cannot last, since selective pressures drive the whole
population towards a single memotype even when alternative niches exists in the environment. The
Group model limits this process by reducing the flux between different memetic groups. This moves
part of the selective pressure within the boundaries of each group, even if imitation and migration tend
still to favor the best memotypes. The creation of group boundaries reduces within-group variation
and increases between-group variation, leading hence to the maintaining of coexisting cultures. It is
worth noting that this result supports the cultures-as-species idea advanced by Pagel and Mace (2004).
In order to have cultural differences the memetic flux among groups must be limited, in analogy with
the interbreeding limits existing among sexual reproducing organisms that stop the genetic flux and
permits speciation.
A second point is that the group section of the memotype (Mg) has the value of a common resource
for each group. Given the model definition, Mg does not represent an arbitrary tag (as, for instance, in
Axelrod 1997), but possesses an actual adaptive value.7 Being a part of the memotype checked against
the environment, Mg contributes indeed actively to the agents’ earnings. Successful group are hence
groups with a group memotype well adapted to the current environment. This is equivalent to hold-
ing a specific knowledge or capacity in human societies. For instance, Renaissance artisans’ guilds
often kept secret their techniques in order to preserve the competitive advantage of their members.
These techniques both helped to define the guilds themselves and represented the foundations of their
wealth. Similarly, in our model Mg both identifies the group and allows a successful exploitation of
the environment. It hence represents an actual “cultural commons” for the group as a whole (see Hess
2008).
A final points regards the advantage of having coexisting cultures, which is mainly linked to the
fact that each of them can exploit a different environmental niche.8 The “environment” used in our
model is too simple to create many niches. As a consequence, few memetic groups can be supported
at the same time and instability, e.g. due to high mutation levels, quickly produces a convergence of
the agent’s memotypes (at least in the cultural evolution models). Nevertheless, in the Group model
two niches are, on average, present after every environment redefinition, which are promptly exploited
by agents, at least under certain parameter conditions. What we found is actually a system where two
different “cultural commons” (i.e. two different Mg) allow the persistence of two different memetic
groups in a two-niche environment. This supports our second hypothesis, arguing that cultures coex-
istence is linked with the exploitation of different niches in a given social-ecological system.
The situation is somewhat more complicated in the niche construction models. A randomly de-
fined environment of length N×m = 1536 holds, on average, only 1.35 niches: a value probably too
7It is worth noting that some explorations of the model using purely symbolic group definition traits — i.e. traits that
were not checked agaisnt the environment — did not produce a significant coexistence of cultures. While this is not crucial
for the current discussion, it may represent the subject of further research.
8Note that, in the real world, a dark side of cultural diversity exists, namely that interactions among different groups and
cultures tend often to degenerate into conflicts (Richerson and Boyd 2001; Soltis et al. 1995).
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small to support the coexistence of different memetic groups. This contrasts with our finding of at
least two coexisting groups for all parameter configurations in the NC-group model. However, the
environment defined in the model depends on the agents memotypes. It is hence not random and can
support more niches. Any memotype in the NC-group model creates at least a niche for its comple-
ment. For instance, the memotype M1 = {0,0,0} creates a niche for the memotype M2 = {1,1,1} and
vice-versa. The point here is that any large group creates a niche for a complementary group, build-
ing hence a two-niche environment. The observed convergence towards the coexistence of two large
groups in the model should therefore not represent a surprise. It is actually the logical consequence of
the niche construction process.
While more complex environments may lead to the coexistence of more groups, our model shows
that the coexistence itself is possible given that (i) the environment possesses a sufficient number of
niches and (ii) some process operates in order to keep the group boundaries at least partially imperme-
able (although it is not necessary to have perfect endogeneity as in Axelrod’s model). This conditions
can be checked against empirical evidence. For instance, Rogers and Ehrlich (2008), in a research
on the evolution over time and space of the shape of Polynesian canoes, show that functional features
change slower than the symbolic ones. This is consistent with our arguments. The adaptiveness of
functional features depends indeed on the law of fluid dynamics and on the technological abilities of
Polynesian people. Since these two factors vary little across islands, it is likely that only one niche
exists for functional features. The fact that we observe a convergence towards a single form — care-
fully conserved over time and changing only as the result of occasional innovations — it is hence
consistent with our first argument. Note also that the innovations themselves, once adopted, tend to
spread rapidly, leading again to a substantial convergence of forms. In absence of niches, the exist-
ing group barriers are indeed not effective to “protect” the diversity and the best canoe design rapidly
spread from island to island fostered by the existing selection processes, e.g. differential fishing yields,
migration success or simply survival of the sailors (Rogers and Ehrlich 2008, 3418).
The situation is markedly different for the symbolic traits of canoes, which presumably have little
or no adaptive effect. In this case, a multitude of niches exists, all sharing the same level of adap-
tiveness (which is low, but this makes no difference as long as it is equal). This reflects in their large
variability, in a condition where even weak barriers are sufficient to maintain significant group differ-
ences. Note also that symbolic markers are often used by humans in order to define group boundaries
(Richerson and Boyd 2005, 221-224), a fact suggesting that these features are not only the product of
different memes shared by different groups, but may represent barriers for the inter-group meme flow
as well.
While this is just an example, it shows how our model can be tested using empirical data. The
crucial point is to evaluate the existence of alternative niches for each trait included in the analysis.
Once that a multi-niche environment is detected, the next question becomes whether a similar number
of memetic groups exists. This crucially depends on the strength of boundaries among groups living
in the environment under observation. The general prediction is that traits strictly associated with
“material” aspects of live will vary only when real alternative niches exists, while symbolic traits are
much more free to differentiate following the existing group boundaries.
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